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"ON THE QT AND VERY HUSH HUSH": A
PROPOSAL TO EXTEND CALIFORNIA'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY TO
PROTECT PUBLIC FIGURES FROM
PUBLICATION OF CONFIDENTIAL PERSONAL
INFORMATION
Gary Williams*
I. INTRODUCTION
In L.A. Confidential, a movie set in the 1940s, a character played by
Danny DeVito works for a tabloid newspaper called On the QT and Very
Hush Hush.' DeVito's newspaper runs stories about scandals affecting the
rich and famous of Los Angeles2 much like a variety of tabloid newspapers,
television shows and magazines do today. One staple of the celebrity scan-
dal trade is stories revealing confidential information about the health, re-
lationships (marital and otherwise), physical appearance and financial af-
fairs of well-known individuals. The practice of publicizing highly
personal, confidential information is not limited to the "tabloid" press.
Mainstream newspapers and news broadcasts have also engaged in the
practice when it suits their needs. For example, in 1992, USA Today forced
Arthur Ashe to reveal to the public that he had AIDS after threatening to
publish this information.3 The continued publication of such information
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School of Los Angeles. B.A_, magna cum laude, 1973,
University of California, Los Angeles; J.D., 1976 Stanford Law School. I want to thank the edi-
tors and staff of the Loyola Entertainment Law Journal for their patience and assistance in the
editing process. In particular, I want to thank Karriann Farrell Hinds for her invaluable sugges-
tions for improving this Article, and Erika Paulsrude and Doug Stenstrom for their unstinting
support, encouragement and assistance. Finally, I must thank the members of my Fall 1998 class
on Privacy and the First Amendment. Your questions, your passion, your thinking and your in-
sights concerning the clash between privacy and freedom of the press were a constant source of
inspiration and reflection. You have challenged me to continue thinking and writing about this
subject. I hope someday to craft a solution worthy of your challenge. While this Article is not
that solution it is, I hope, a modest beginning.
1. L.A. CONFIDENTIAL (Warner Bros. 1998).
2. Id.
3. ARTHUR ASHE & ARNOLD RAMPERSAD, DAYS OF GRACE 7-17 (1993).
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troubles many celebrities, as evidenced by the spate of lawsuits filed seek-
ing damages for such revelations 4 as well as California legislation and a
federal proposal sponsored by the Screen Actors Guild. 5 Additionally,
public opinion polls indicate that these invasions of privacy trouble the
general public as well.6
The law has responded to these concerns by recognizing a right of in-
formational privacy, or the right to control who has access to confidential
personal information.7 By definition, the right of informational privacy
conflicts with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press because
it restricts the ability of the press to publish true information.8 Neverthe-
less, California courts have held that public figures do retain a "zone of
privacy,"'9 only with more circumscribed boundaries than those protecting
private figures.10 This Article proposes a method for defining a zone of
privacy for public figures consistent with the federal and California con-
stitutional guarantees of freedom of the press utilizing California's consti-
tutional guarantee of privacy.
Using a hypothetical scenario, Part II of this Article illustrates the
problems public figures face when they assert privacy claims. The hypo-
thetical involves two public figures who are dismayed by the unauthorized
public disclosure of their confidential medical history. Part III summarizes
the constitutional and common law standards applicable to the privacy
claims made by these two individuals. First, this Part discusses the inher-
ent tension between the right to informational privacy as established under
California law and the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press.
This Part also explores the "newsworthiness" standard used by California
courts to resolve questions posed by that tension. Next, this Part will out-
4. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
5. The Screen Actors Guild sponsored the Personal Privacy Protection Act which Senators
Barbara Boxer, Diane Feinstein and Orrin Hatch introduced in the United States Senate. Personal
Privacy Protection Act, S. 2103, 105th Cong. (1998). The California Legislature passed similar
legislation in 1998 which the Governor subsequently signed into law. S.B. 262, 1997-98 Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 1998) (codified at CAL.CIv. CODE § 1708.8 (West 1999)).
6. In 1997, 92% of respondents of one poll expressed concern over threats to their privacy.
Mark Boal, Spycam City, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Oct. 6, 1998, at 40. According to a Time/CNN
poll, 87% of Americans want to be asked for permission any time medical information about
them is revealed. Statement of Solange E. Bitol, Legislative Counsel (visited Feb. 20, 1999)
<http://www.house.gov./reform/reg/hearings/091798/bitol 1091798.html>.
7. See S.B. 262, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998) (codified at CAL. Civ. CODE § 1708.8
(WEST 1999)); see also Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 Cal. 4th 1 (1994); Dean
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 392-98 (1960).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
9. See Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 772-73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
10. See id.
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line the definition of a "public figure." Finally, this Part will catalogue
some California cases addressing privacy claims filed by public figures ap-
plying the common law private facts tort to illustrate the newsworthiness
and public figure standards used to evaluate these claims.
Part IV analyzes the problem faced by public figures in attempting to
protect their privacy under California's constitutional guarantee of a right
to privacy. This Part applies the standard proposed in my previous Arti-
cle" to evaluate the informational privacy claims of public figures. I argue
that limited classes of confidential information are so personal and sensi-
tive that the state's interest in protecting informational privacy is compel-
ling even where the individual is a "public figure.' 2 For those classes of
information, I argue that the right to privacy outweighs the right to publish
personal information.
Finally, Part V details the major objections to recognizing a public
figure's right to informational privacy. Further, Part V explains why the
courts should continue to seek an appropriate balance between public fig-
ures' right to be left alone and the public's "right to know." In this Part, I
argue that a limited, uniform "zone of privacy" applicable to private and
public figures alike strikes an appropriate balance between the competing
interests involved. As such, I propose a standard that will inform editors
11. Gary Williams, California's Constitutional Right to Privacy: Can It Protect Private
Figures from the Unauthorized Publication of Confidential Medical Information?, 18 Loy. L.A.
ENT. L.J. 1 (1997).
12. For the purpose of this Article, I am limiting my definition of "public figure" to a person
who does not hold an elected or appointed government position, but has achieved some level of
public notoriety. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.a.
I have deliberately omitted "public officials" from this definition. The public's right to re-
ceive information about people who are elected or appointed to public office presents especially
difficult problems under both the First Amendment and California's constitutional guarantee of
freedom of the press. U.S. CONST. amend. I (granting freedom of the press); CAL. CONST. art. I
(granting freedom of the press). Limits on the right to publish information about public officials
adversely impact the public's ability to make informed decisions about self-governance and affect
core First Amendment values. These concerns give me greater constitutional pause than limits on
the right to publish information about the lives, loves and medical history of movie stars, athletes,
crime victims and people associated with public figures.
I recognize this distinction is problematic at its borders. Many "public figures" aspire to
serve in public office or are public figures precisely because they seek to influence public debate.
Jesse Jackson and Jerry Falwell are two examples of this phenomenon from opposite ends of the
political spectrum. Other public figures regularly use their celebrity status to influence public
policy. For example, actor and director Rob Reiner recently championed Proposition 10 in Cali-
fornia. See Sabin Russell, No on 10 Campaign Spending Revealed, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 4, 1999, at
A18.
The difficulty in drawing distinctions between public figures and public officials undoubt-
edly has influenced the United States Supreme Court, which treats public figures and public offi-
cials as equals for First Amendment purposes. See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts and Associated
Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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appropriately regarding where the public's right to know ends and the pub-
lic figure's right to privacy begins.
II. THE INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY PROBLEM FOR PUBLIC FIGURES
In my first Article exploring California's constitutional right to in-
formational privacy, I utilized a hypothetical where the Editor-in-Chief of
the fictional Los Angeles Herald Express ("Express") directed her staff to
publish a series of articles about people with HIV or AIDS.1 3 The series
was designed to educate people and to reduce the "public ignorance and
hysteria" associated with the disease. 14 The fictional series successfully
convinced over 5,000 people to write letters to the Governor urging him to
sign legislation prohibiting discrimination against persons with HIV or
AIDS.
15
The hypothetical in my previous Article addressed the claim of Dr.
Susan Eldridge, a physician who contracted HIV through an operating
room accident.16 Dr. Eldridge, a private figure, did not consent to the Ex-
press' disclosure of her illness and sued, claiming publication of the infor-
mation about her illness violated her right to privacy under the California
Constitution.'
7
This Article explores the previous hypothetical further by considering
the plight of two other individuals whose status as HIV/AIDS patients the
Express publicized without their consent. The first person is Jack Silvester,
a high school physics instructor and formerly popular basketball player
with the Los Angeles Lakers in the sixties and early seventies. After Sil-
vester retired from professional basketball, he began a new life as a high
school teacher. Silvester sought to live out his life as an ordinary teacher
and citizen by shunning publicity and consistently refusing all press re-
quests for interviews.
Mr. Silvester contracted HIV through a blood transfusion. Express
reporters learned of Silvester's illness through a reliable source while
working on the HIV/AIDS series. An Express reporter called Silvester to
verify the information, but he refused to confirm his HIV status. Instead,
Silvester asked the reporter not to publish the story about him out of respect
for his privacy. Silvester told the reporter he had not authorized anyone to
discuss or release his confidential medical history. Silvester explained to
13. See Williams, supra note 11, at 1-3.
14. See Williams, supra note 11, at 1.
15. See Williams, supra note 11, at 1-2.
16. Williams, supra note 11, at2.
17. Id
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the reporter that publication of a story about his HIV status, whether true or
not, would compromise his ability to teach effectively.
The reporter confirmed the information through other sources and the
Express printed the story about Silvester as part of its series. The day after
the story appeared, roughly half of Silvester's students began to boycott his
classes. Parents circulated a petition demanding Silvester's termination or
reassignment to a desk job. The Board of Education ("the Board") and the
school principal allowed Silvester to remain in the classroom. One month
after the story appeared, eighty-five percent of his students boycotted his
class and the Board received a petition signed by ninety-percent of the par-
ents of Silvester's students. As a result, the Board capitulated to the pro-
tests and directed the principal to reassign Silvester to an administrative po-
sition through the end of the semester. Subsequently, the Board issued a
press release stating Silvester was transferred to minimize campus disrup-
tion.
The Express article also exposed the HIV status of Carla Fence, the
infamous daughter of Darryl Fence. Darryl Fence is an ambitious police
chief in Los Angeles County who plans to run for governor in the next
election. Carla Fence, thirty-five, has been heavily involved in the local
drug scene for many years. Fence has not lived with Chief Fence for
twenty years -and rarely speaks to him, partially as a result of her drug us-
age. After Chief Fence announced the formation of his gubernatorial elec-
tion committee, the Express began a background check on him and his
family. The Express reporters knew of Carla Fence's history of drug use
from past reports from confidential sources. However, during its investi-
gation, Express staff learned from another confidential source that Fence
contracted HIV through the use of a contaminated hypodermic needle and
subsequently developed AIDS. After receiving confirmatory medical rec-
ords, the Express ran a story detailing Carla Fence's drug use and her ill-
ness. Shortly after the story appeared, Fence was laid off from her job as a
receptionist and her month-to-month apartment lease was terminated.
Should Silvester and Fence be able to sue the Express for the damage
to their careers and reputations caused by the unauthorized revelation of in-
formation about their medical condition? Their claims are more trouble-
some than Dr. Eldridge's in the previous Article because the common law
recognizes that Fence and Silvester are public figures."' Cases interpreting
the common law right to informational privacy have granted the press far
greater latitude in publishing the otherwise confidential information of
18. See supra text accompanying note 12.
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public figuresi' 9 The hypothetical illustrates the permanent effects of the
designation as a "public figure" and how far reaching that definition ex-
tends. 20
1I1. INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY AND PUBLIC FIGURES: AN OVERVIEW
In their action against the Express, Silvester and Fence will claim that
publication of confidential information about their medical condition is ac-
tionable because they alone should have the right to decide whether to
publicize that information. These claims present special problems under
the First Amendment because the speech involved is true.2' By allowing a
remedy for publishing private facts, courts could punish editors for merely
publishing certain true and lawfully obtained information. 22 Arguably, pri-
vacy remedies also interfere with the public's right to receive informa-
tion-a right related to freedom of speech and freedom of the press.23
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the clash between the
competing values of informational privacy and freedom of the press in two
seminal cases, Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn24 and Florida Star v.
B.J.F.25 In both cases, the Court held that the First Amendment does not
allow states to protect privacy interests where the press publicizes true in-
formation lawfully obtained from public documents or proceedings about
matters of public concern.26
19. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
20. Ms. Fence is probably a public figure because of her father's status as a public official
running for office. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.a. Mr. Silvester will remain a public figure
forever because of his past status as a public figure without regard to his desires or how he con-
ducts his life. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.c.
21. One prominent constitutional law scholar has noted that "the Court's rulings reflect the
principle that the First Amendment must virtually always protect the publication of true informa-
tion." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 864 (1997). 1
accept this proposition, but posit in this Article that protection of highly sensitive personal infor-
mation that an individual has treated as confidential presents a rare instance where the First
Amendment should not protect publication.
22. Generally, editorial control is the exclusive province of news editors. See Miami Herald
Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
23. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 564 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see generally Lamont v. Post-
master Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 305-307 (1965) (finding that interference by a government official
with an individual's ability to receive mail based on its content is a violation of the First Amend-
ment). While its contours are in dispute, the existence of a constitutional right to receive infor-
mation seems indisputable. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 944
(2d ed. 1988).
24. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
25. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
26. For a more thorough discussion of these rulings, see Williams, supra note 11, at 4-9.
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While the Court was very solicitous of editorial discretion in those
cases, it declined on both occasions to prohibit completely sanctions
against the press for the publication of true information. 27 The Court ex-
plained that its reluctance to prohibit sanctions against the press stems from
the recognition that claims of a right of privacy are "plainly rooted in the
traditions and significant concerns of our society. 28 Indeed, in Cox, the
Court acknowledged the existence of "a zone of privacy surrounding every
individual, a zone within which the State may protect him from intrusion
by the press.,, 29 Thus, despite dire predictions about the demise of the right
to informational privacy in the wake of the Florida Star decision,3 ° courts
continue to find the press liable for violating the right to privacy in select
cases.
31
IV. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF PRIVACY CLAIMS
BY PUBLIC FIGURES
A. Legal and Constitutional Standards Applicable to
Privacy Claims by Public Figures
1. Newsworthiness
The United States Supreme Court in Cox32 and Florida Star33 limited
actionable privacy claims by imposing the "truthful" and "legally obtained"
standards of review. However, these standards do not address the differ-
ence between the zones of privacy enjoyed by public versus private indi-
viduals. California courts have expanded these standards even further un-
27. Cox, 420 U.S. at 491; Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 533.
28. Cox, 420 U.S. at 491.
29. Id. at 487 (emphasis added).
30. In Florida Star, Justice White wrote in his dissent that the majority accepted "appellants
invitation to obliterate one of the most noteworthy legal inventions of the 20th century: the tort
of the publication of private facts." 420 U.S. at 550 (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
After the Florida Star decision, many legal commentators agreed that the private facts tort was
dead. See, e.g., Peter B. Edelman, Free Press v. Privacy: Haunted by the Ghost of Justice Black,
68 TEX. L. REv. 1195 (1990); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for aHeavyweight: A Farewell to
Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291 (1983); Lorelei Van Wey, Note,
Private Facts Tort: The End is Here, 52 O1o ST. L.J. 299 (1991).
31. In her Article, The Hidden First Amendment Values of Privacy, Sean M. Scott lists ap-
pellate cases decided after Florida Star where courts have upheld claims for invasion of privacy.
See Sean M. Scott, The Hidden First Amendment Values of Privacy, 71 WAsH. L. REv. 683, 696-
698 (1996).
32. 420 U.S. at 495-97.
33. 491 U.S. at 530.
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der common law by providing additional interpretations of California con-
stitutional law. In an effort to reconcile protection of the freedom of the
press with the common law right to informational privacy, California courts
have utilized a "newsworthiness" standard to evaluate claims of invasion of
privacy. 34 The newsworthiness standard holds that publication of confi-
dential information is not actionable if the information is "newsworthy.,
35
In California, plaintiffs asserting informational privacy claims must prove
that an article lacks newsworthiness to succeed in their cause of action.36
The definition of newsworthiness is so broad that it appears impossi-
ble for a person to recover on a claim for invasion of informational privacy.
In Briscoe v. Readers Digest Ass 'n,37 for example, the California Supreme
Court held that a publisher need not intend to educate the public to render
an item newsworthy.38 The court concluded that the line between enter-
taining and educating is too elusive for courts to define because "[w]hat is
one man's amusement teaches another's doctrine."3 9 Theoretically, once
an editor determines that an article contains an element of newsworthiness,
the court will not second guess the editor's determination.
The California Supreme Court's most recent foray into the indetermi-
nate nature of the "newsworthiness" standard is Shulman v. Group WPro-
ductions, Inc.4° In Shulman, the plaintiffs were videotaped, without their
knowledge or consent, as they received treatment for injuries suffered in a
serious automobile accident. 4' The videotape subsequently appeared on the
defendant's nationally syndicated "reality television show."' 2 In declaring
the broadcast newsworthy, a majority of the court concluded "a publication
is newsworthy if some reasonable members of the community could enter-
tain a legitimate interest in it. . . . Thus, newsworthiness is not limited to
'news' in the narrow sense of reports of current events. ' 3
34. Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 478-79 (Cal. 1998). Many other state
courts adhere to the newsworthiness standard as well. See id. at 479; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) TORTS, § 652D cmt. g (1977).
35. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 479; see Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 244 Cal. Rptr. 556,
561 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Sipple v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 668 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984).
36. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 469.
37: 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971).
38. Id. at 38.
39. Id. at 38 n.6 (citing Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1997)).
40. 955 P.2d at 475.
41. Id
42. The documentary television show is called On Scene: Emergency Response. Id.
43. Quoting from the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the opinion continues,
"[Newsworthiness] extends also to the use of names, likenesses or facts in giving information to
the public for purposes of education, amusement or enlightenment, when the public may rea-
CALIFORNIA'S CONSTITUIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
At first blush, the elasticity of the court's definition might appear to
make virtually any published information "newsworthy" so long as some
entity is willing to print it.44 However, the newsworthiness standard is not
as malleable as the case law suggests. First, the paramount test of "news-
worthiness" is determining whether the matter is of legitimate public inter-
est according to "community mores.' 45
The line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giv-
ing of information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a
morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake,
with which a reasonable member of the public, with decent
standards, would say that he has no concern. 4
Second, California courts have entrusted determination of
newsworthiness to juries: "Whether a publication is or is not news-
worthy depends upon contemporary community mores and standards
of decency. This is largely a question of fact, which a jury is uniquely
well-suited to decide."' 7
California courts continue to treat "newsworthiness" as a jury ques-
tion after the Florida Star decision. In Hood v. National Enquirer, 4 a Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal remanded the case to determine whether informa-
tion published about Eddie Murphy's support of a child he fathered out of
wedlock and the child's mother was newsworthy. The court reaffirmed
that newsworthiness is a jury question when it stated:
[C]ourts have repeatedly held that even when an event is gener-
ally newsworthy, the publication of certain facts may not be
such ... . We cannot say as a matter of law that the details of a
celebrity's financial support of his child and Ms. Hood are
newsworthy. While the fact of that support may be newsworthy,
the financial details may not. A trier of fact could conclude that
how much money Mr. Murphy gave plaintiffs, the price of their
home, the amount of Ms. Hood's monthly support, and the size
sonably be expected to have a legitimate interest in what is published." kd at 485-86.
44. As one commentator observed, "Essentially, if an item has been printed it is deemed
newsworthy by the courts." Scott, supra note 31, at 700.
45. Sipple v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 670 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
46. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (1976)).
47. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 772 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (citation
omitted). Diaz relied on Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., where the California Supreme
Court held that newsworthiness was a jury question. Id (citing Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n,
Inc., 483 P.2d 34,43 (Cal. 1971).
48. Hood v. National Enquirer, 17 No. 9 ENT. L. REP. *3, *7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). This
opinion was not officially published. I am indebted to Professor F. Jay Dougherty for providing
this opinion.
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of Christian's trust fund, were private facts, the publication of
which was unnecessary to the story told and not newsworthy. 49
Although the California Supreme Court upheld a grant of summary
adjudication dismissing the plaintiffs' privacy claims in the Shulman case,
it implicitly agreed that newsworthiness can be a jury question. 0 The court
stated that "an analysis focusing on relevance allows courts and juries to
decide most cases involving persons involuntarily involved in events of
public interest without 'balanc[ing] interests in an ad hoe fashion in each
case."'
' 51
Unfortunately, limitations on the definition of newsworthiness do not
provide sufficient guidance to editors considering news stories or plaintiffs
pursuing privacy claims. In reality, the standards that guide a jury's deter-
mination of newsworthiness are surprisingly vague. Juries are instructed to
consider the "[11 social value of the facts published, [2] the depth of the ar-
ticle's intrusion into ostensibly private affairs, and [3) the extent to which
the party voluntarily acceded to a position of public notoriety. 52 When
considering the depth of an intrusion, the jury must determine whether the
revelation of the information was "grossly offensive" to most people. 53 As
one court of appeal remarked, "If there is room for differing views whether
a publication would be newsworthy the question is one to be determined by
the jury and not the court.'' Juries are invited, essentially, to substitute
their differing judgments for that of editors on a case by case basis, apply-
ing the mores of their particular community. A publication deemed news-
worthy in Los Angeles could be found to violate the right to privacy in
Anaheim, San Marino or Redondo Beach. As such, one can only imagine
the nervousness editors of the Los Angeles Times, or any major newspaper
circulated to suburbs and beyond, experience because of the endless possi-
bilities for liability this standard allows.
2. Newsworthiness and Public Figures
In applying the newsworthiness standard to the privacy claims of
public figures, California courts raise the theoretical bar for recovery even
higher.55 When public figures sue for invasion of privacy under the com-
49. Id. at *6-*7.
50. Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 486 (Cal. 1998).
51. Id. (quoting Briscoe, 483 P.2d at 43 n.18 (emphasis added)).
52. Briscoe, 483 P.2d at 43 (citing Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 922 (Cal. 1969)).
53. See id.
54. Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 244 Cal. Rptr. 556, 562 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
55. All courts adhere to this standard. The California standard governing the privacy of
public figures is drawn directly from the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 652D.
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mon law tort, they must contend with a lowered expectation of privacy be-
cause, as established by case law, those who are famous, notorious or just
plain noteworthy lose some portion of their privacy.
[T]here is a public interest which attaches to people who by their
accomplishments, mode of living, professional standing or call-
ing, create a legitimate and widespread attention to their activi-
ties. Certainly the accomplishments and way of life of those
who have achieved a marked reputation or notoriety by appear-
ing before the public such as actors and actresses, professional
athletes... may legitimately be mentioned and discussed in
print or on radio or television. Such public figures have to some
extent lost the right to privacy, and it is proper to go further in
dealing with their lives and public activities than with those of
entirely private persons.56
a. Who Is a Public Figure?
In general, the law defines public figures as people who, by virtue of
their position, activities, or happenstance, have become the object of public
attention.57 California courts have adopted the two-category treatment of
public figures as provided in the Restatement (Second) of Torts which dif-
ferentiates between voluntary and involuntary public figures.58
Voluntary public figures are people who have placed themselves af-
firmatively in the public eye by engaging in public activities or assuming a
prominent role in institutions or activities of interest to the general public.5 9
Actors, 60 professional athletes, 61 politicians, 62 prominent musicians, and
singers and entertainers 63 are included in this category. The public may
possess a legitimate interest in a wide range of information about voluntary
public figures, "includ[ing] information as to matters that would otherwise
be private. ' 64
56. Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 405,414 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962).
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (1977).
58. Id. § 652D cmt. e, f.
59. Id. § 652D cmt. e.
60. Carlisle, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 414; O'Hilderbrandt v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 114 Cal. Rptr.
826, 830 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
61. Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines and Broad., 392 F.2d 417, 419 (9th Cir. 1968).
62. Miller v. Bakersfield News-Bulletin, 119 Cal. Rptr. 92, 94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975); Yorty v.
Chandler, 91 Cal. Rptr. 709, 712 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
63. Star Editorial v. United States District Court, 7 F.3d 856, 861 (9th Cir. 1993); Montan-
don v. Triangle Publications, 120 Cal. Rptr. 186, 191 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. e (1977).
1999]
348 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19
In contrast, involuntary public figures are persons who have not
sought public attention, but who have become "news" as the result of their
involvement in or association with an otherwise newsworthy event. 65 This
category includes crime victims, accident victims, accused criminals,6 and
people who perform heroic acts.67 A person can become an involuntary
public figure, with the concomitant loss of privacy, simply by being related
to a voluntary public figure.6 ' As the court explained in Carlisle, "people
closely related to such public figures in their activities must also to some
extent lose their right to the privacy that one unconnected with the famous
or notorious would have.
69
The seminal case discussing this subcategory of involuntary public
figures is Kapellas v. Kofman.70 In Kapellas, a newspaper printed an edito-
rial opposing the candidacy of Inez Kapellas for the Alameda City Coun-
cil. 71 The editorial argued against the election of Mrs. Kapellas to the
council because two of her sons had been arrested and one daughter "had
been found wandering on the street several times." Mrs. Kapellas filed
suit on behalf of herself and her children arguing, inter alia, that publica-
tion of the information violated her children's right to privacy.7 The court
could have resolved the case based on the fact that the bulk of the informa-
tion publicized in the editorial was contained in public records. 74 Instead,
the California Supreme Court focused on the public figure status of the
children, holding that the children lost their privacy as a result of their
mother's candidacy.
Those who seek elected public position realize that in doing so
they subject themselves, and those closely related to them, to a
searching beam of public interest and attention .... Although
the conduct of a candidate's children in many cases may not ap-
pear particularly relevant to his qualifications for office, nor-
mally the public should be permitted to determine the impor-
tance of the reported facts for itself.... The children's loss of
65. Id. § 652D cmt. e (1977).
66. Id.
67. See Sipple, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
68. Carlisle, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
69. Id.
70. 459 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1969).
71. Seeid. at915 n.2.
72. Id.
73. Id. at914.
74. See id. at 924.
CALIFORNIA'S CONSTITUIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
privacy is one of the costs of the retention of a free marketplace
of ideas. 75
b. Application of the Newsworthiness Standard and
Public Figure Standards: Carla Fence
As a result of the Kapellas holding, Carla Fence is probably a public
figure solely because she is the daughter of a police chief and an aspiring
politician. The public may be interested in how well Chief Fence fared as a
father and role model in evaluating his candidacy and qualifications for of-
fice. 76 While the Court has yet to address a privacy claim made by the
adult child of a politician, the language of the Kapellas opinion quoted
above suggests that the age of the child claiming privacy is immaterial in
determining whether an actionable invasion of privacy has occurred.77
c. Public Figure Status Is Forever
Courts have held that once individuals become public figures, they
can never regain the privacy that they lost due to their status. 78 In Sidis v.
F-R Publishing Corp., the plaintiff was a famous child prodigy who gradu-
ated from Harvard at the age of sixteen. 79 After his graduation, Sidis delib-
erately sought to live a life of anonymity.80 However, twenty years later, a
magazine printed an article chronicling his early achievements and con-
trasted them with his current life.8" As the Sidis court explained:
[T]he article is merciless in its dissection of intimate details of
its subject's personal life, and this in company with elaborate
accounts of Sidis' passion for privacy.... [I]t may be fairly de-
scribed as a ruthless exposure of a once public character, who
has since sought and has now been deprived of the seclusion of a
private life.8 2
75. Id. at 923-24.
76. See Kapellas, 459 P2d at 923-24.
77. See id at 914. Despite the Kapellas holding, involuntary public figures do retain a bit
more privacy than their voluntary counterparts. The press is allowed to publish otherwise private
information about involuntary public figures if it bears a logical relationship to the reason the per-
son is newsworthy, and the publication is not intrusive in great disproportion to its relevance. See
Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469,486 (Cal. 1998).
78. Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d. 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
79. Id. at 807.
80. Id.
81. See id
82. Id. at 807-08.
1999]
350 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINAdENT LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19
Sidis sued the publisher claiming the article violated his right to pri-
vacy.83 The Second Circuit held that the article did not violate Sidis' pri-
vacy because he remained a public figure.
William James Sidis was once a public figure. As a child prod-
igy, he excited both admiration and curiosity.... In 1910 he was
a person about whom the newspapers might display a legitimate
intellectual interest, in the sense meant by Warren and Brandeis,
as distinguished from a trivial and unseemly curiosity .... Since
then Sidis has cloaked himself in obscurity, but his subsequent
history, containing as it did the answer to the question of
whether or not he fulfilled his early promise, was still a matter
of public concern. 4
The California Supreme Court adopted the Sidis principle in Forsher
v. Bugliosi.85 James Forsher, a minor figure in the Manson "family" saga,
sued Vincent Bugliosi for naming him twice in Bugliosi's book Helter
Skelter.86 Both references to Forsher connected him to unsolved murders
associated with the Manson "family., 87 Forsher sued alleging, inter alia,
that the publication of his name in the book violated his right to privacy be-
cause his identity was not a matter of public interest.88 His complaint
stated that "at no time ... did [Forsher] seek or in any way encourage the
publication of his name" nor did he "attempt to solicit publicity" regarding
his association with the Manson clan.89 The court ruled against Forsher
and distinguished its earlier holding in Briscoe adopting "the more general
rule that once a man has become a public figure or news, he remains a
matter of legitimate recall to the public mind to the end of his days.' 90
d. Application of the Newsworthiness and Public Figure Standards:
Jack Silvester
A court analyzing Jack Silvester's claim would classify him as a vol-
untary public figure because of his former career as a professional basket-
83. Id. at 807.
84. Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809.
85. 608 P.2d 716 (Cal. 1980).
86. Id at 716-21.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 724.
89. Id.
90. Id. In adopting the Sidis approach, the California Supreme Court rejected in dicta the
suggestion that a person loses his privacy for all time by virtue of being a public figure. Briscoe
v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 483 P.2d 34, 41 n.13 (Cal. 1971).
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ball player.91 As a result, the validity of his claim would turn on whether
his public figure status endures despite his attempts to shun it. Unfortu-
nately for Silvester, Forsher and Sidis demonstrate that no matter what he
does or does not do, he may never enjoy any substantial expectation of pri-
vacy.92 Due to Silvester's status as a former professional basketball player,
the courts have determined that the public is entitled to know Silvester's
subsequent history, if for no other reason than people often want to know
"where are they now?"' 93 Silvester, like Forsher, will remain a matter of le-
gitimate recall for the rest of his days.94 Because the Express article an-
swered the question of what happened to Silvester, it was a publication dis-
cussing a matter of public concern.
B. Theory vs. Reality
The opinions addressing the clash between privacy and freedom of
the press suggest that public figures do not possess a zone of privacy which
they can insulate from public scrutiny. In reality, public figures have re-
covered judgments, successfully settled lawsuits, and even obtained re-
straining orders against the press concerning the publication of private and,
in some instances, not so private information.
Perhaps the most notable example is a recent case involving Brad Pitt.
Playgirl magazine printed an edition containing photographs of Pitt and his
former girlfriend, Gwyneth Paltrow, on a private beach "au naturel." 95 Pitt
sued the magazine alleging that publication of the photographs, apparently
taken from long range via a telephoto lens, invaded his privacy.96 In a sur-
prising decision, a California superior court issued two orders mandating
that Playgirl recall the issue.97 The court issued these orders after the
magazine was distributed to subscribers and appeared on newsstands de-
spite the fact that the photographs were widely available on the Internet be-
fore the publication of the issue.9"
A court awarded similar protection in Hood v. National Enquirer.99
In Hood, the National Enquirer printed a story reporting the details of a
91. Under this analysis, Carla Fence also suffers a permanent loss of privacy.
92. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.c.
93. See id
94. See Forsher, 608 P.2d 726-27.
95. The trial court's reasoning is not available because the judge ordered his opinion sealed.
Ann W. O'Neill, Judge Orders Recall ofMagazine Over Nude Photos, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 8, 1997,
B3.
96. Id
97. Id.
98. Id Playgirl is appealing the decision granting the injunctions. Id
99. Hood v. National Enquirer, Inc., 17 No. 9 ENT. L. REP. *3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
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relationship between actor Eddie Murphy and a child he fathered out of
wedlock. 100 Not only did the story report that Murphy paid child support to
and purchased a house and car for the mother of the child, it revealed sev-
eral intimate details of the child's life, including pictures of him, identifi-
cation of the mother and child by name, photographs of their home and car,
identification of the community where they lived, and the amount of money
Murphy provided to support the mother and child.' 0' The mother sued on
behalf of herself and her son alleging the story violated their right to pri-
vacy. 02 The trial court dismissed the complaint on the theory that both
plaintiffs were public figures and did not enjoy an expectation of pri-
vacy. 03 However, the California Court of Appeals reversed and remanded
the case for trial on the merits despite the fact that it agreed that mother and
child were public figures.'°4
Finally, the most infamous recent case of public figures gaining com-
pensation for the revelation of private information concerned actress Pam-
ela Anderson Lee and her estranged husband Tommy Lee. Ultimately, the
couple settled a lawsuit against an Internet publisher who sold unauthorized
copies of a videotape of the couple having intercourse in a car and on a
boat. 05 Settlement of the lawsuit is intriguing because the Lees made the
privacy claim despite having discussed the contents of the videotape, in
some detail, on Howard Stem's radio show. 1 6
V. THE PUBLIC FIGURE PROPOSAL
These celebrity cases reinforce the Diaz court's finding that "[plublic
figures .. . are entitled to keep some information of their domestic activi-
ties and sexual relations private.' 0 7 The challenge is to decipher the
boundaries of the "zone of privacy" that protects public figures.
The current status of the right to informational privacy for public fig-
ures is unsatisfactory for public figures, publishers and courts alike. Public
figures-and those closely associated with them-must live forever with
the constant fear that every aspect of their personal lives may be exposed
for public consumption and titillation no matter what steps they take to
100. See id at *3.
101. See id
102. See id
103. See id
104. See id The case was subsequently settled. Telephone Interview with Paul Hoffnan,
Plaintiffs' counsel (June 30, 1998). However, the terms of the settlement are confidential. Id
105. Ann O'Neill, Fly in the Getty Punch Bowl, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 7, 1997, atB1.
106. See id.
107. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 773 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
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protect that private information. Having the details of intimate information
about one's physical or mental condition, financial affairs, or sexual or
other personal relationships laid bare for all the world to see merely re-
quires the collaboration of one mercenary friend, 18 a persistent and enter-
prising photographer, 1' 9 a larcenous worker," 0 and a single editor willing to
publish the information. This burden becomes particularly onerous to bear
in those instances where the person whose private information is revealed
is an involuntary public figure.
In his critique of this Article, Los Angeles Times editor Craig Matsuda
intimates that privacy concerns are largely the domain of the wealthy and
privileged classes."' He shares this opinion with distinguished company.
Several scholarly and lay critics argue that the right to privacy, as imagined
by Warren and Brandeis and enforced by the courts, is merely an elitist in-
vention and protection. "
2
An initial look at the reported cases on privacy appears to support
those contentions. However, the involuntary public figure category largely
concerns people who are neither wealthy, powerful nor privileged. While
the concerns discussed here certainly extend to Arthur Ashe, Collin Powell,
and their families, those concerns are equally shared by Oliver Sipple, Ruth
Shulman, and their families.
For these "common folk" thrust into the public spotlight, the invol-
untary and permanent loss of privacy is a serious and often painful depri-
vation. Howard Rosenberg, a columnist for the Los Angeles Times, de-
scribed one recent example where "ordinary people" found their private
grief invaded." 3 The syndicated television show Life on the Beat video-
108. In Hood, a relative of a "friend" of the mother took the photographs of Ms. Hood and
her child that appeared in the National Enquirer. Hood, 17 No. 9 ENT. L. REP., at *8. The
"friend's" relative sold those photographs to the Enquirer. Id.
109. Mr. Pitt and Ms. Paltrow were on a private, secluded beach at the time they were pho-
tographed. O'Neill, supra note 105, at B3. The same thing happened to President and Hillary
Clinton, who were photographed in an intimate moment of togetherness on a private beach with-
out their knowledge or consent. Times Wire Services, Life's a Beach for Vacationing Clintons,
L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 3, 1998, at A16. The resulting photographs were published nationally. Id
110. It is suspected that a person working on the renovation of the Lees' home stole a copy
of the videotape of their sexual escapades. O'Neill, supra note 105, at BI.
111. Craig Matsuda, An Editor's Dissent to Professor Gary Williams's Privacy Plan for A
Priori, Statutory Curbs on Press Scrutiny ofKey Information About Public Figures, 19 LoY. L.A.
ENT. L.J. 363 (1999).
112. See, e.g., James H. Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy: Demystifying
a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 875 (1979); Franzen, Imperial Bedroom, NEW
YORKER MAG., Oct. 12, 1998, at 48; see also Linda McClain, Inviolability and Privacy: The
Castle, The Sanctuary and The Body, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 195, 207-15 (1995) (cataloguing a
host of feminist critiques of privacy as an instrument of male dominance).
113. Howard Rosenberg, Pleas for Privacy Left Unheeded, LA- TIMEs, Nov. 30, 1998, at
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taped the discovery of Michael Marich's body in his apartment and the no-
tification to his family of his death.' 1 4 Despite repeated requests by the
Marich family not to broadcast the footage, the segment, featuring the call
and shots of the apartment and the corpse, aired nationally." 5 When the
family filed suit alleging the broadcast invaded their privacy, the trial court
dismissed the Marich's invasion of privacy claim against the production
company because the broadcast was "newsworthy."' 6  The standards I
propose in this Article would provide some measure of protection for the
private grief of members of the Marich family, for Oliver Sipple's sex life,
and for Ruth Shulman's medical treatment, in addition to protecting the
personal confidences of the rich, powerful and privileged.
The current state of the law is no easier for publishers. Editors must
live with the uncertainty generated by legal standards applied to these cases
which, although heavily tilted in their favor, allow juries to award damages
if they find publication of confidential information to be "a morbid and
sensational prying into private lives for its own sake."'"17 Moreover, if the
person is an involuntary public figure, the editor must attempt to locate a
more elusive boundary than that applicable to voluntary public figures."'
Thus, publication of private information about public figures remains a
high-risk, high-stakes venture for the press as evidenced by the settlements
in the Hood and Lee cases, and the judge's order in the Pitt case.
Similarly, courts applying the newsworthiness standard must uneasily
toe the line between allowing the press carte blanche and serving as censors
of editorial discretion. The Shulman opinion evidences the California Su-
preme Court's uneasiness about the ephemeral character of that line.
Newsworthiness---constitutional or common law-is also diffi-
cult to define because it may be used as either a descriptive or
normative term. "Is the term 'newsworthy' a descriptive predi-
cate, intended to refer to the fact there is widespread public in-
terest? Or is it value predicate, intended to indicate that the
publication is a meritorious contribution and that the public's
interest is praiseworthy?" A position at either extreme has un-
palatable consequences. If "newsworthiness" is completely de-
Fl.
114. Id.
115. Id A television crew accompanied members of the Los Angeles Police Department as
they entered the victim's apartment. Id The crew videotaped his apartment and his body, and
recorded the call made by the police to the victim's parents notifying them of Marich's death. Id
116. Id
117. Sipple v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 670 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (1977).
118. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.a.
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scriptive-if all coverage that sells newspapers or boosts ratings
is deemed newsworthy-" it would seem to swallow the publi-
cation of private facts tort, for it would be difficult to suppose
that publishers were in the habit of reporting occurrences of little
interest." At the other extreme, if newsworthiness is viewed as a
purely normative concept, the courts could become to an unac-
ceptable degree editors of the news and self-appointed guardians
of public taste."9
A. The Proposed Standard
The standard I propose avoids the normative/descriptive conundrum
of attempting to define "newsworthiness" in individual cases. It entails a
two-prong test which prohibits publication of confidential information
about anyone 20 under California's constitutional right to privacy if: 1)
well-established social norms recognize the need to maximize individual
control over dissemination of the information revealed, and 2) the person
took reasonable steps to keep the information confidential. This standard is
an amalgam assembled from two sources: California's general standard for
state constitutional protection of informational privacy, and the standard for
determining whether communications with an attorney, physician, or
spouse are protected by the evidentiary privileges.
1. Determining Well-Established Social Norms
The first prong of the standard is derived from California's interpre-
tation of its constitutional right to privacy. In 1972, California voters
amended article I section 1 of the state constitution to declare privacy an
inalienable right of California citizens. 121 In White v. Davis,12 2 the Califor-
nia Supreme Court observed that the primary purpose of the constitutional
amendment was to provide protection against the encroachment on per-
sonal freedom caused by increased surveillance and data collection.1 23
119. Shulman v. Group W. Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 481 (Cal. 1998) (citing Comment, The
Right of Privacy: Normative-Descriptive Confusion in the Defense of Newsworthiness, 30 U.
Cm. L. REv. 722, 725 (1963)).
120. Excluding, for purposes of this discussion, public officials.
121. CAL. CONST. Art. I, § 1. Article I section 1 now reads: "All people are by nature free
and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and
liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happi-
ness and privacy." Id.
122. 533 P.2d 222 (Cal. 1975).
123. Id at 234.
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Using the ballot argument in favor of the proposition 24 as the amendment's
legislative history, the court divined that voters desired to give individuals
the ability to control circulation of confidential personal information.
12
In Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass n,126 the California Su-
preme Court built on the foundation laid in the White opinion by con-
structing the standards that govern claims of privacy under the constitu-
tional amendment.127 After surveying the case law and commentary on the
common law tort of invasion of privacy, the court concluded that the con-
stitutional right to privacy was far broader in scope than the tort.
Our reference to the common law as background to the Califor-
nia constitutional right to privacy is not intended to suggest that
the constitutional right is circumscribed by the common law tort.
The ballot arguments do not reveal any such limitation. To the
contrary, common law invasion of privacy by public disclosure
of private facts requires that the actionable disclosure be widely
published and not confined to a few persons or limited circum-
stances. In contrast, the ballot arguments describe a privacy
right that "prevents government and business interests from
collecting and stockpiling unnecessary information about us or
misusing information gathered for one purpose in order to serve
other purposes or to embarrass us." Obviously sensitive per-
sonal information may be misused even if its disclosure is lim-
ited.
28
The Hill court ruled that informational privacy-the right to control
access to sensitive personal information-is a core value protected by the
124. Id. The ballot argument represents the only available legislative history of the amend-
ment:
First, the statement identifies the principle "mischiefs" at which the amendment is
directed: (1) "government snooping" and the secret gathering of personal informa-
tion; (2) the overbroad collection and retention of unnecessary personal information
by the government and business interests; (3) the improper use of information
properly obtained for a specific purpose, for example, the use of it for another pur-
pose or the disclosure of it to some third party, and (4) the lack of a reasonable
check on the accuracy of existing records. Second, the statement makes clear that
the amendment does not purport to prohibit all incursion into individual privacy but
rather that any such intervention must be justified by a compelling interest. Third,
the statement indicates that the amendment is intended to be self-executing, i.e.,
that the constitutional provision, in itselft "creates a legal and enforceable right of
privacy for every Californian."
Id.
125. Id. at234 n.11.
126. 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 648-49 (citations omitted).
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constitutional right to privacy.1 29 The court further identified the three
elements which constitute the cause of action for violation of the constitu-
tional right to privacy. 130 According to Hill, plaintiffs must prove that they
possessed a legally cognizable privacy interest, which includes the right to
prevent dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential personal in-
formation.' The court determined that information is private within this
definition when "well-established social norms recognize the need to
maximize individual control over its dissemination and use to prevent un-
justified embarrassment or indignity.', 3 2  The plaintiff can identify these
norms by referring to "the usual sources of positive law governing the right
to privacy-i.e., common law development, constitutional development,
statutory enactment, and the ballot arguments for the Privacy Initiative."'
' 33
a. Advantages of the "Private Information" Standard
Over the Current "Newsworthiness" Standard
The "private information" standard has several advantages over the
newsworthiness standard. First, the protection afforded to private informa-
tion is limited in scope. Only information protected by constitutional law,
statutory law and common law development will be deemed "private."
California case and statutory law reveals that the information clearly falling
within those confines are financial information,134 medical information,
13
129. See id at 654.
130. See id at 654-55. The elements of a state constitutional cause of action are: (1) the
"identification of a specific, legally protected privacy interest," (2) "a reasonable expectation of
privacy on the plaintiff's part;" and (3) a serious invasion of the plaintiff's privacy by the defen-
dant. Id.
131. Id
132. Hill, 865 P.2d at 654. The court noted these norms create a threshold reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy. See id
133. Id. at 654-55. The remaining elements of a cause of action for violation of the consti-
tutional right to privacy require plaintiffs to prove that they possessed a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the information revealed and that the revelation resulted in a serious invasion of their
privacy. Id. at 655-58.
I argue that so long as the public figure takes reasonable steps to insure the confidentiality of
their medical history, financial data and family relations as outlined in this section, they do have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in that information. See Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188
Cal. Rptr. 762, 771 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
As to the third element, it is unquestionable that publication of confidential information from
these categories without the subject's consent constitutes a "serious" invasion of those privacy
interests. See id. at 773.
134. Valley Bank ofNev. v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d 9773 (Cal. 1975); Burrows v. Superior
Court, 529 P.2d 590, 592-93 (Cal. 1974); City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young, 466 P.2d 225,
231 (Cal. 1970).
135. Board of Med. Quality Assurance v. Gherardini, 156 Cal. Rptr. 55, 60 (1979).
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information about intimate personal relationships, 3 6 and psychological and
psychiatric information. 
37
Second, the private information category is clear-cut and the informa-
tion covered is easily identified. Reference to readily available sources will
reveal to editors and their attorneys whether confidential information is
protected and therefore actionable. If a story depends upon confidential
medical or financial records, or reveals confidential information about
someone's personal life, editors and lawyers would quickly recognize that
the story exceeds acceptable bounds.
Third, the standard has the advantage of prior acceptance by society
as an appropriate limitation on the availability of certain information be-
cause "private" information is already protected in contexts other than
publication. For example, courts are precluded from inquiring into confi-
dential communications between husbands and wives, doctors and their
patients, or attorneys and their clients even where the information sought
would assist in the determination of questions properly before the courts.'38
Similarly, although disclosure of personal financial information would as-
sist voters in deciding how to cast their ballots and would help minimize
the appearance of impropriety, government is not allowed to force politi-
cians to reveal that information. 139 Therefore, recognition of the "private
information" standard has the added advantage that it is a limitation which
society would apply equally to itself as well as to the press.' 40
Finally, the "private information" standard has an added advantage
over the "newsworthiness" standard because it would establish classes of
136. The ballot argument accompanying the Privacy Initiative states that the measure would
protect "our homes, [and] our families .... Ballot Pamphlet, Proposed Amendments to Califor-
nia Constitution, General Election (Nov. 7, 1972), at 27; see Williams, supra note 11, at 13-16.
137. See In re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d 557 (Cal. 1970); Tylo v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d
731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
138. These are examples of evidentiary privileges. See CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 950-62 (law-
yer-client privilege), 970-87 (spousal privilege), 990-1007 (doctor-patient privilege) (West
1995).
139. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea, 466 P.2d at 228. Discovery of financial information is re-
stricted as well, even though this affects the courts' search for truth. Valley Bank of Nev., 542
P.2d at 978.
140. In Florida Star, one cogent criticism leveled against Florida's statute was that it applied
only to instruments of mass communication. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 542 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Justice Scalia rightly questioned the importance of the privacy right advanced by
Florida when the law did not prohibit private citizens from revealing the same information. Id.
"This law has every appearance of a prohibition that society is prepared to impose upon the press
but not upon itself. Such a prohibition does not protect an interest 'of the highest order."' Id As
I explained in my earlier piece, one advantage of California's constitutional guarantee is that it
applies to anyone who wrongly disseminates confidential personal information that falls within
the definition discussed above. See Williams, supra note 11, at 30-32.
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information protected by the right to informational privacy that would re-
main constant without regard to the status of the individual discussed. This
would eliminate much of the arbitrary character of the current method for
determining "newsworthiness," because private figures and public figures
would have the same clearly defined "zone of privacy." As a result, editors
could publish information about people with more certainty because the in-
formation protected would remain constant. Similarly, the courts would
have clear, readily identifiable standards to apply, as a matter of law, when
evaluating claims for violation of the right to informational privacy.
b. Review of the "Private Information" Standard by the Court
To increase the protection of the press, and to reduce the potential
chilling effect of lawsuits claiming an invasion of privacy, determining
whether information is "private" should be a question of law decided by the
courts. Such a rule would allow courts to dispose of many actions claiming
that published information is "private" by preliminary motions. 141 This
would reduce the costs associated with litigating dubious claims because
demurrers and summary adjudication would eliminate illegitimate claims
before discovery proceeds. Additionally, judges arguably are more attuned
to the constitutional nuances involved in claims for violation of the right to
privacy and less inclined than juries to punish a publisher because an article
was unpopular.' 42 Finally, because courts would make the determination of
the private information standard as a matter of law, parties would have the
additional protection of independent review of the trial court's decision by
the appellate courts. Therefore, if a trial judge erred in determining that
published information was protected, reversal on appeal would be swift and
sure.
2. Reasonable Steps to Insure Confidentiality
The standard's second prong is based upon the laws governing evi-
dentiary privileges. These laws allow the holder of the privilege to with-
hold from the courts the contents of confidential communications with her
spouse, attorney, physician, or mental health professional if she takes rea-
sonable steps to insure the confidentiality of the communication. The per-
tinent language is found in California Evidence Code section 952:
141. See, e.g., Good Gov't Group v. Superior Court, 586 P.2d 572 (Cal. 1978); Desert Sun
Publ'g Co. v. Superior Court, 158 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1979).
142. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 499, 505 (1984).
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As used in this article, "confidential communication between
client and lawyer" means information transmitted between a cli-
ent and his or her lawyer... in confidence by a means which, so
far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third
persons other than those who are present to further the interest of
the client .... 143
Under the standard I propose, plaintiffs would have the burden of
proving that they treated the information as confidential. They would have
to prove that the information published was only made available to rela-
tives, close friends, or professionals who required the information to pro-
vide services to these complaining parties. Plaintiffs would also have to
prove that they admonished those persons to maintain the confidentiality of
that information and not to share it with the general public. 144
VI. CONCLUSION
The standard I propose presents a reasonable accommodation of the
competing interests of the press, which seeks to publish confidential infor-
mation about a "public figure," and the "public figure" who desires to keep
that information away from the prying eyes of the press.' 45 Essentially, the
proposed test removes from the "newsworthy" classification certain highly
private personal information without regard to the status of the subject.
The information protected, confidential financial data, medical and psy-
chological information, and information about interpersonal relationships,
is so intensely personal that publication of that information without the
subject's consent is intrusive in disproportion to its relevance.'4 Because
the information is not newsworthy as a matter of law, actions to remedy the
publication of that information should not violate the First Amendment be-
143. CAL. EviD. CODE § 952 (WEST 1995). Similar language governs communications
between physicians and patients, psychotherapists and patients, priests and penitents. Id. at §§
992, 1012, 1032. The privilege for spousal communications applies if the communication "was
made in confidence between him [sic] and the other spouse while they were husband and wife."
Id. § 980.
144. Theoretically, "private" information should remain protected so long as the subject dis-
cusses it only with his/her spouse, members of his/her immediate family and close friends in con-
fidence. "Immediate family" would include siblings, parents, children and spouses. Courts have
properly recognized that a person does not waive his/her right to privacy because he/she discusses
confidential information with family members and close friends. See Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527
F.2d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 425 U.S. 998 (1976); see also Diaz v. Oakland
Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 771 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). The need to share one's fortunes,
misfortunes, and adventures with those closest to you should not occasion a waiver of the right to
decide whether the general public should have access to that personal information.
145. I have defined the term here as excluding public officials.
146. See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 486 (Cal. 1998).
CALIFORNIA 'S CONSTITUIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
cause of the state's compelling interest in protecting privacy, as expressed
through its constitutional provision. While the public may lose access to
some information about public figures it desires, that loss is minimal, par-
ticularly when compared to the harm caused by unfettered publication of
confidential "private" information.
147
147. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 11, at 17-18 (discussing the public interests served by
protecting the confidentiality of medical records).
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